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I 
Economic Consequt)"ce~ of the New Iraqi 
Constitution. . · ; 
Or. Robert Looney 
Professor, Naval Postgraduate School, US 
Constitutions can play a critical role in founding and unifying new or renewing states: 
Iraq is no exception. A new constitution for post-Saddam Iraq can play a key role 
in reunifying and strengthening the national consciousness of the country. It can 
also lay the foundation for the creation of a viable dynamic economy. To many the 
constitution drafted and ratified in the summer of 2005 holds out this promise. To 
others, the ratified constitution contains too many flaws and inconsistencies to enable 
the country to escape from its current state of violence and economic stagnation. 
Even worse many contend 1 that unless a series of contentious issues surrounding 
the constitution and the events leading up to its drafting are resolved quickly, the 
integrity of Iraq as a unified state will be in question. 
One of the main controversies surrounding the 
constitution is its federal nature. The 1990s and 
early 21 '' century have witnessed an increased 
interest in federalism os o viable system for conflict-
Sunni Arab delegates on the constitutional 
commission hove accused the dominant Shia and 
Kurdish factions of seeking to force the constitution 
through, despite the lack of a consensus over some 
of its most sensitive elements. prone societies, especially 
those in the developing world. 
federalism hos been promoted 
os an optimal arrangement for 
responding to ethnic diversity. 
Its moin strengths lie in the 
foct thot it grants internal self-
Yet · despite the potential 
advantages of a federal 
system, the debates in 
A related issue is the manner 
in which the constitution treats 
the underlying causes of the 
"rentier state problem." It 
is widely posited that rentier 
states like Iraq which depend 
Iraq have become 
increasingly polarized. 
determination to territorially concentrated groups; 
makes for institutional expression of pluralism; 
ond enhances political porticipotion, equality, 
accountability, and efficient and equitable provision 
of services. 
Iraq is the latest country to consider adopting 
a federal system of government. Yet despite the 
potential advantages of a federal system, the 
debates in Iraq have become increasingly polarized. 
on one mineral resource like oil for l 0 percent 
of GDP and/or 40 percent of export income 
(Iraq's values ore much higher) ore prone to 
militarization, dvil war and economk instability. 
More to the point, resource abundance commonly 
leads to corruption, distributional inequalities, 
and economic mismanagement eventually fueling 
internal conflicts. 
The sections below examine the new Iraqi 
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constitution from the perspective of its potential 
economic consequences. In particular, the 
economic implications, both positive and negative, 
of the creation of a federalist state are assessed. 
The closely related issue of the constitution's 
treatment of oil resources and the possibility of Iraq 
circumventing the rentier state syndrome are also 
examined in some detail. 
Main Economic Issues 
Addressed 
Developed largely by the Shia and Kurdish blocs, 
the constitution adopts an extremely strong form 
of federalism. The result is a constitution that 
makes it both easy and attractive to form other 
multi-province regional governments. Each of 
these regional administrations can choose to wield 
greater legal and executive powers than the federal 
government. 
The Constitution: 
General Economic Provisions 
Article 23:. 
(1 '1) Private property is protected and the owner 
has the right to use it, exploit it, and benefit from it 
within the boundaries of the law. 
(2nd) Property may not be taken away except for the 
public interest in exchange for fair compensation. 
This shall be regulated by law. 
(3'd) (a) An Iraqi has the right to ownership 
anywhere in Iraq and no one else has the right to 
own real estate except what is exempted by law. 
(b) Ownership with the purpose of demographic 
changes is forbidden. 
Arti~ltl'. 24: 
The State shall guarantee the freedom of 
movement for workers, goods and Iraqi capital 
between the regions and the provinces. This shall 
be regulated by law. 
Artis;le 2~: 
The state shall guarantee the reforming of the Iraqi 
economy according to modern economic bases, in 
a way that ensures complement investment of its 
resources, diversifying its sources and encouraging 
and developing the private sector. 
Article 26: 
The detailed economic sections begin with Article The country shall guarantee the encouragement 
22. Many of the economic articles can be found of investments in the different sectors. This shall be 
in most modern-day constitutions. Several have regulated by law. 
direct bearing on the issue at hand:2 Arti~7: 
Artis;le. 22: (l '1) public property is sacrosanct, and its 
(1 '1) Work is a right for all Iraqis in a way that protection is the duty of every citizen. 
guarantees them a good life. (2nd) Regulations pertaining to preserving and 
(2nd) The law regulates the relation between administrating state property, the conditions set 
employees and employers on an economic basis, for using it and the cases when giving up any of 
while keeping in consideration rules of social \ the property maybe allowed shall be regulated by 
justice. \ law. 
(3rd) the state guarantees the right to form or join l\rti~k .. 2..8..; 
syndicates or professional unions. This shall be (1 '1) Taxes and fees shall not be imposed amended, 
regulated by law. collected or eliminated except by law. 
(2nd) Low income people should be exempted 
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from taxes in a way that guarantees maintaining 
the minimum level necessary·for a living. This shall 
be regulated by low. 
Implications of the General Economic 
Provisions · 
Before examrnrng the implication of the 
constitution's main economic provisions, a word 
of caution is in order. 3 The impact of a constitution 
on economic policy in particular and on economic 
performance in general is not simply a matter of 
the text itself. For one thing, constitutions con be 
written or unwritten. Some countries with a written 
constitution also hove unwritten constitutional 
conventions. In the United States, for instance, the 
independence of the central bank (The Federal 
Reserve Boord} is not explicitly stated in the 
constitution as it is in some others. Yet the board 
enjoys considerable de facto autonomy because 
an unwritten convention ensures that the executive 
and the legislature would incur costly political 
sanctions if they tried to interfere. 
Second, constitutions can be effective or ineffective. 
The constitutions of the formerly communist 
countries played no role in regulating political life. 
In many countries today, the constitution is little 
more than a piece of paper. 
Third, in countries with a constitutional tradition, 
the real constitution consists of the thousands of 
court decisions that have spelled out the abstract 
and general provisions of the original document 
and adjusted them to changing circumstances and 
problems that were unforeseen and unforeseeable 
at the time the constitutions were formulated. , 
In Iraq's case, there is another safeguard. In 
the days immediately before the election took 
place, th.e various factions~Shiites, Sunnis and 
Kurds agreed that the parliament to be elected in 
December 2005 will create a commission to review 
Gt1Jf Y11qrbook 20011 • 2Q06 .. 
the constitution and propose amendments. In turn, 
these amendments will be submitted to yet another 
referendum six months later. 4 
With these caveats in mind, if implemented, the 
articles noted above would establish o modern, 
market driven economy.5 In many ways, the 
constitution will result in o continuation of the 
controversial neoliberal economic reforms6 
introduced in late 2003. At that time, the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) enacted lows 
that: (a) give foreign investors equal rights with 
Iraqis in the domestic market; (b) permitted the 
full repatriation of profits; (c) instituted o flat tax 
system; (d) abolished tariffs; (e) enforced a strict 
intellectual property rights regime; (f) planned to 
sell off a whole range of state-owned companies; 
(g) prepared to reduce food and fuel subsidies; 
and (h) eventually privatize many social services 
such as health, education and water delivery. 7 
Whether the constitution's economic agenda is 
the best way to proceed at this time is certainly 
on open question. Debates in modern political 
philosophy are to a large extent organized around 
two polar positions. On the one hand, there is 
the view that societies ought to maximize some 
aggregate utility or wealth in the sense of dynamic 
growth over time rather than static allocative 
efficiency. On the other hand, there is the view 
(usually associated with John Rowls) that societies 
ought to assure the highest level of well-being 
for the worst-off members. The first view is often 
referred to as the efficiency-oriented and to the 
second as the· security-oriented. 8 
The econorhic sections of the constitution agreed 
upon toward the end of August 2005 set o 
somewhat different tone than in earlier versions. 
As late as June 30, 2005, drafts of the constitution 
made repeated calls for "social justice" as the basis 
of building society. This emphasis was missing in 
.Gulf l'tesearch Center :(< n o .w I e d ll e f u r A 1.1 
Section Five - Developrl')~nf~ in Iron, !taq, and Yemtin 
later versions. 
The Iraqis wanted, at least on. paper, to build a 
Scandinavian-type welfare system in the Arabian 
desert with Iraq's vast oil wealth to be spent on 
upholding every Iraqi's right to education, health 
care, housing and other social services. "Social 
justice is the basis of building ;ociety," the draft 
declared. All of Iraq's natural resources would be 
owned collectively by the Iraqi people.' Everyone 
would have the right to work and the state would 
be the Iraqi people's collective instrument for 
achieving development.9 
In short, the writers of the constitution appear to 
have shifted from a security-
completed elementary school, but just 9 percent 
had graduated from high school. Twenty percent 
of the respondents were illiterate. 
While we still do not have a clear picture of the 
contemporary dynamics of the Iraqi economy, it is 
still safe to say that the country's economic health 
will be a key determinant of its long run stability. 14 
Clearly, factors such as the lack of commercial 
credit15 together with uncertainty due to the security 
situation have largely brought investment in the 
formal segments of the economy to a halt. 16 Yet, 
from anecdotal accounts, 17 there are indications· 
that many areas of the shadow economy are 
prospering and, as during 
oriented constitution to one 
more focused on attempting 
to achieve high levels of 
economic efficiency. It is 
not dear why the shift in 
emphasis occurred. One 
analyst feels10 it was a 
result of US pressure. This 
While we still do not have a deor 
.pkture of the contemporary 
dynamics of the Iraqi economy, 
It i$ still. safe to say .. that the 
the period of sanctions, 
successfully adapting to the 
harsh environment. 
In short, the Iraqi 
economy currently exists 
as a huge welfare state. 
The government is the 
country's leading employer, 
country's economic hec:dfh will 
be a key determinant of its long 
run stability. 
interpretation is consistent 
with the observation of a Sunni negotiator who 
concluded: "This constitution was cooked up in an 
American kitchen, not an Iraqi one." 11 
This shift in emphasis of the market over the state 
has q number of implications, especially if the 
country's poor economic performance continues. 
The rough picture we have at the present time is 
one of an economy that probably contracted by 
about 35 percent in 2003, recovering somewhat 
in 2004. At least 30 percent12 of the labor force 
\ 
is unemployed with 60 percent depending on 
food rations to survive. A November 2004 
survey13 of 28,500 Iraqi families conducted by the 
government's Central Statistical Office (CSO) foun·d 
the average monthly income of an Iraqi family was 
$127. Of those surveyed, only 15 percent had not 
. . 
paying the wages of around 
half the country's workforce. Yet for budgetary 
reasons, there are plans to reduce the number 
on the state's payroll. The neoliberal reforms will 
only place further pressure on the government 
to scale back many of its job creating activities. 
As things stand, many government ministries 
can carry out their duties with only about 40-60 
percent of employees. 18 Yet with little private sector 
investment, it is hard to see how the unemployment 
rate con be reduced significantly. 
The logical area of job creation, the American- led 
' reconstruction effort, has had only a minor effect 
on employment with at most around 150,000 
Iraqis employed on such projects. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA) has established 
a network of training and recruitment centers in 
. , '. <iiulfRes~arch Cehter I<n o w led!! e f o r A I l 
Iraq's major cities, but relatively few jobs have 
been found. 
As of May 2005, the MLSA had found work 
for 115,000 Iraqis in the previous six months. 
Unfortunately, 110,000 people had applied for 
jobs in the MLSA centers in Baghdad alone in 
that time, and more than 600,000 had registered 
across the country. 
Given its current financial situation, the Iraqi 
government cannot afford to employ more people. 
Certainly over time, the country's unemployment 
problems will have to be 
Both assumptions appear unrealistic given the 
security situation and the intense competition 
faced by most firms. In fact, there is considerable 
evidence that capital is flowing out of the country 
rather than into new productive activities. It hos 
been estimated that by 2005 as much as $2 billion 
of capital hod left Iraq following the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein. Jordan has attracted o large 
shore of these funds. Perhaps even direr for the 
country's long-run economic viability is the massive 
brain drain of young Iraqis from the country. Again 
Jordan is a prime destination 
solved by the private sector. 
Unfortunately at this time, most 
private companies outside the 
construction sector are not in a 
position to significantly increase 
their hiring. In fact, many Iraqi 
companies ore struggling 
. .. there is. coli'siderable for many of the country's most talented youth and successful 
businessmen. 19 ~v1c1\lnc~••,••tbat•••·c~p:r1tj1· ....... ~~ 
. .. . c,>µtc,>f th~ cr,>untry 
•·~ctl. .· .... •tbth'l ilnto >new 
pi'(,~~ctiv~ ~~Hy0i~s. · 
To sum up, Iraq's new 
constitution lays the beginnings 
of a foundation for moving 
just to compete ofter years of protectionism and 
severe shortages of key inputs such as capitol 
and technology. The surge of imports under the 
government's free trade policies while helping to 
keep inflation rotes down has placed a severe 
strain on existing companies while discouraging 
investment on the port of new firms. 
Instead of direct government action to create 
jobs, the constitution implicitly assumes that this 
will occur through privatization. In May 2005, 
Iraq's Ministry of Industry announced plans to 
privatize most of its 46 state-owned companies. 
The rationale underlying this decision was concern 
over the companies drain on the government's 
financial resources, in an attempt to reduce "the 
financial burden on the state caused by the firrri~s 
large operating losses. t.nother rationale was that 
privatization will help attract both domestic and 
foreign investment thus expanding the demand for 
workers. 
ahead with the shock therapy 
economic program initiated by the Coalition 
Provisional Authority in 2003. Shock therapy is 
on opt term often used to describe the package 
of measures that transformed the economies of 
the former communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe from communist to capitalist. These 
measures were highly controversial, with many 
economists, especially the "new institutionolists" 
contending that a more gradual approach could 
guide the transition to a market economy while 
avoiding much of the dislocation associated with 
shock therapy's market driven, limited government 
approach. 
To the new institutionolists, the experience of 
transition sh6ws that the neoliberal policies of 
liberalizotio~, stabilization and privatization that 
ore not grounded in adequate institutions, may not 
deliver successful outcomes. Yet the constitution is 
silent on how and when the institutions needed to 
support the free market agenda ore to be created. 
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The economic theories of federalism may provide 
some insights as to the manner in which this 
institutional development might 'proceed now that 
the constitution hos been ratified. First Hoyek,20 
suggested that, because local governments and 
consumers hove better information than the 
notional government about locol conditions and 
preferences, they will make better decisions. 
Second, Tiebout21 argued that competition among 
jurisdictions allows citizens to sort themselves 
and match their preferences with a particular 
menu of public goods. In this spirit, Musgrove22 
demonstrated how the appropriate assignment 
of jurisdictions over public goods and taxes can 
increase welfare. Finally, Qian and Weingast23 
show that political institutions serve a similar role 
for government officials OS firm institutions do for 
firm managers. Appropriately 
of the 1970s under socialism and state plonning. 24 
The Kurds hove prospered in a relatively free market 
so the constitution no doubt has wide appeal in 
that region. The Kurdistan Regional Government 
(KRG) is pro-Western, technocratic and investment 
friendly and Kurdish leaders want to exploit these 
features to attract western investment to the 
northern hydrocarbon sector.25 
If a loose federation is agreed upon, it is easy 
to see the three major regions of Iraq adopting 
variants of these three somewhat different and 
potentially competing economic systems. Whether 
or not these systems will be able to coexist 
successfully is something the theoretical literature 
has yet to shed much light on. Would the likely 
more efficient Kurdish system prevail over the less 
productive? Given the availability of oil revenues 
and their possible allocations 
designed institutions help align 
the interests of public officials 
with citizens, while federalism 
can help government officials 
to maintain the positive and 
negative incentives necessary 
for thriving markets. 
... the constitution is silent on 
howaod when the institutions 
needed to support the free 
market agendo are to be 
to the various regions, one con 
envision o number of outcomes 
where subsidies might enable 
the medium-term perpetuation 
of outcomes not commonly 
found in the developing world. crea.ted. 
These theories of federalism, however, implicitly 
assume a fairly common set of economic systems 
across the various regions. For example, slightly 
different variants of free market capitalism across 
the various US states with some states having 
As the theory of federations 
suggests, the potential might be there for on overall 
efficient economy. As in many countries however, 
the "oil curse" may produce an outcome for from 
ideal. 26 
more state financed programs than others. In the Treatment of Oil in the Constitution 
Iraqi case, one con visualize a more diverse set While important from the perspective of the 
of economic systems evol-Jing in the three main country's economic recovery and eventual growth 
regions. Elements of on Islamic economic system \ and developmeqt, the debates over the type of 
appeal to many Shiites and ore one distinct \ economic system- to be adopted by Iraq hove been 
possibility. The many Sunni, frustrated over the rather low-key. Perhaps of all the articles in the 
country's dire economic plight and the seeming constitution, those relating to oil hove been the 
inability of the government to restore a sound most contentious. The key provisions ore outlined 
economy often allude to the economic successes in Articles 109 and 110.27 
Knowledge fqr All 
A!li!iil~ J Q2 
Oil and gos is the property bf all the Iraqi people 
in all the regions and provinces. 
Article 1 lQ 
(1 '1) The federal government will administer oil 
and gas extracted from current fields in cooperation 
with the governments of the producing regions 
and provinces on condition 
The constitution's treatment of oil production 
and revenues present o number of unattractive 
scenarios to the Sunnis and it is easy to see why 
they hove been quite opposed to the new charter. 
Specifically, they ore concerned with the creation of 
o federal system where they ore at o major financial 
disadvantage vis-a-vis the Kurds and Shiites. In 
this regard, the constitution 
that the revenues will 
be distributed fairly in o 
manner compatible with the 
demographical distribution 
all over the country. A 
P~t'bag$.~~ a1Lthe.•.'1rtides .. ih the 
· ·· c(.m~ti,ution, the>~<+ r'lcding • fo . oil 
have been the most contentious; 
defines o region as one 
or more provinces that 
choose by referendum 
to form a region. A 
quota should be defined for a specified time for 
affected regions that were deprived in on unfair 
way by the former regime or later on, in a way to 
ensure balanced development in different ports of 
the country. This should be regulated by law. 
(2"d) The federal government and the governments 
of the producing regions and provinces together will 
draw up the necessary strategic policies to develop 
oil and gos wealth to bring the greatest benefit 
for the Iraqi people, relying on the most modern 
techniques, market principles and encouraging 
investment. 
Article 110 clarifies that revenue-sharing will be 
based on needs as well as demography, reflecting 
the region's "duties and obligations, and toking 
into consideration the (region's) resources and 
needs. 
The wording of Article 110 hints that exploration 
and development strategy will be undertaken 
in partnership with the regions. The wording "of 
Article 109 does not exclude foreign ownership of 
upstream oil industry assets, though most senior 
oil officials ore not in favor of this level of foreign 
investment. Presumably, the detail of hydrocarbon 
development policy will be left to notional and 
regional legislatures. 28 
referendum can be called 
fairly easily: either by one third of the members 
in the relevant provincial councils or by one-tenth 
of the voters in these provinces. Moreover, two 
or more regions hove the right to create o single 
larger region. "Here the Sunni nightmare in plain 
block and white: The Kurds ore allowed to form a 
single supra-region in the oil-rich north, the Shiites 
to form theirs in the oil-rich south, while the Sunnis 
ore left in the oil-dry center."29 Clearly, the Sunnis 
fear that the Kurds and Shiites will create their own 
super-regions which will dominate Iraqi politics 
and economics. 
As noted above, Article 110 addresses the 
resulting inequities by declaring that revenue from 
oil and gas extraction will be fairly distributed 
through the country according to need. However 
this section, Article 110, refers only to revenue 
from current oil and gas fields not from the vast 
untapped wells. Sunnis fear they will see little 
revenue deri~~d from new wells brought on line in 
the future. Ai the constitution stands, the regional 
states are delegated authority over all new fields 
and therefore control over the negotiation of 
exploration contracts and the bulk of revenues 
derived from future production. 
Article 11 0 suggests that the Sunni areas could 
A 1.1 
be disadvantaged for some time on grounds that 
the Shia south and Kurdish north suffered chronic 
underdevelopment during the Saddam era. The 
exact formula for revenue-sharing will be fluid and 
shaped by Iraq's national parliament where the 
Sunnis are likely to be a distinct minority. 
The Kurdish government concloded at least three 
production-sharing agreements with Turkish and 
Norwegian companies in the lost few years that 
government in Baghdad would not hove complete 
control over oil resources: 32 
Unless there is some central control, like a notional 
oil company, there is going to be chaos, especially if 
preference is given to regional laws that would override 
federal laws. 
Muhammad-Al Zainy, senior energy economic 
analyst, Center for Global Energy Studies, 
London 
cover several fields in the 
Kurdish areas. Those deals 
were done independent 
of the Iraqi oil ministry. At 
the same time, Baghdad 
did not recognize those 
agreements and warned 
companies ogoihst signing 
such agreements. With 
the new constitution, such 
·· e~$. ~~rn ... that: 
, •....••...•...... · .... · ..... · ........•. ·••·••···. > .·.~l .. t11~. f~d~ral 
I om against federalism, it will 
not be good for the oil sector. 
It will only put it bock instead of 
developing it. g~v~rm·nen~ ·· .... '"<~ii .. ···•·•ITlafter~ /.11~s been·.·.·· rn(J.rgincsliz~d, the · ..powers 
c;>fthe ~rUte ~il·pr~~u~ing region 
ln th~· s911th gr' J11ore .. lil<~ly•·.t9 
Shamkhi Faraj, director-
general, Economics and Oil 
Marketing Qtow. 
agreements would now become legol.30 
While turning a de facto situation in Kurdistan 
into a legitimate state, the implications for the rest 
of Iraq are more significant. Iraqi oil experts warn 
that while the role of the federal government in 
oil matters has been marginalized, the powers of 
the Shiite oil-producing region in the south are 
more likely to grow. At the moment, there are 
two producing governorates in the south, Bosrah 
and Missan. However, other governorates hove 
non-exploited oil fields such as Nasiriyoh, which 
contains the Ghorraf oil field. According to the 
constitution, those governorates can set up regions 
and become semi-autonomous like the region of 
Kurdistan. 31 
Related concerns hove been expressed by a 
number of knowledgeable oil executives and 
industry analysts. The main concern is that the 
constitution as worded could lead to several 
autonomous zones under which a central 
The governorates are hardly 
able to toke care of their local affairs let alone run on 
industry and negotiate contracts. I am certain that oil 
companies have been taken aback by this. 
Saadallah Al-Fathi, former senior Iraqi oil official 
The constitution does not hove a clear, detailed or mature 
vision about the issue of oil. This is a recipe for chaos. We 
will not only lose central decision moking in the process 
but also the question of legislation. Companies will face 
huge legal problems. If they sign with a political entity, 
their contract may not be protected in the long term. 
Mustafa Alani, Gulf Research Center 
Optimists soy in the longer term, the decentralized 
government coi..tfd lead to a foster development 
of Iraq's oil ;nd gas fields. However, Sunni 
dissatisfaction with the constitution could agitate the 
insurgency further and keep foreign investments at 
bay. In that case, only the Kurdish region, which has 
been spared the security problems characteristic of 
AU 
the rest of Iraq would be able to attract foreign 
companies to invest in developing its oil and gas 
fields.33 · 
A good case can be made that the constitution's 
treatment of the ownership and distribution of oil 
resources and revenues hos the potential in the 
context of a federalist • 
Gvlf Y eorbook 2005 • 2006 
government stability relying on fiscal transfer rather 
than statecraft. 
4. Many resource-rich governments prioritize 
security spending, while oil exporting countries in 
particular face a higher risk of armed conflict. 
5. Extremely high levels of resource revenues 
like Iraq's have allowed 
state organization to 
contribute to the country's 
economic instability. By 
not separating the state 
from oil Le. the direct 
link whereby oil revenues 
accrue directly to central 
and regionalgovernments, 
The main concern is that the 
constitution as Worded could 
lead to several autonomous 
zones under which a central 
government in Boghdad would 
n<>t have complete control over 
governments to maintain 
stable autocracies by 
buying social peace, co-
opting political opponents 
and funding effective 
security agencies. 
6. In most cases, however, oil resources 
a concentration of power 
by factionalized ruling elites, poor governmental 
legitimacy, as well as foreign vested interests 
presents major challenges to peace in resource-
dependent countries. 
the constitution has left in place a mechanism that 
has more often than not led to full rentier state 
development. Rentier states can potentially have 
more problematic relations with society, having 
lesser need to negotiate taxation terms with social 
elites, potentially leveling class distinctions and 
thereby making ethnic and religious differences 
more significant, and creating a rentier class that is 
disconnected from social and political constraints. 
The result hos been an all too common set of 
outcomes in oil-prod\,Jcing developing countries: 34 
1. Economic growth has been comparatively 
slower in most resource-dependent countries since 
the 1970s; a pattern that also affected most oil 
exporters after the end of the oil boom in the mid-
1980s. 
2. Resource dependence has been associated 
with poor governance, nigh levels of corruption and 
(often incompetent) authoritarianism. Governm~r:its 
in resource dependent countries tend to be mo~e 
corrupt as a result of the discretionary control of 
large rents generated by resource exploitation. 
3. Oil-producing stotes also often exhibit extreme 
levels of institutional conservatism and inertia, with 
7. The consequences of the "resource curse" for 
the population are often paradoxical as it finds 
itself "hostage" to an omnipotent state, source of 
both hope and frustration when facing conditions 
of poverty, inequalities, and human rights abuses. 
Although the state may pursue populist policies 
by redistributing resource wealth, the state is 
ultimately insulated from the population through 
the independent tax base that the resource wealth 
provides. Many Iraqis fear that future oil revenues 
will be squandered in the midst of a culture of 
corruption and favoritism reminiscent of Saddam 
Hussein's regime. 
While it is not clear that a constitution is necessarily 
the best plqce to address these issues in any sort 
of detail, no doubt many observers would hove 
felt more comfortable if the drafters hod expressed 
a general commitment to follow through on 
institutions capable of combating or keeping in 
check many of the rentier state excesses. Here the 
biggest problem may be one of perception on the 
part of Iraqis themselves. As one recent visitor to 
grappling with the problem of arriving at mutually 
agreeable sharing formulas. Perhaps because 
Iraq observed: 35 
A serious problem among 
both· intellectuals and the 
public at large is the mistaken 
perception that because 
"Iraq is a rich country," all 
·· F~~h~trnq.re, .•. the•.~9n~tifution 
le~ves.ope~··the pos~jpiUty <>f 
qbus~ t)fec;onqrn.ic:.• P'?W~r .by 
the Kvrds and Shiites. 
of their more decentralized 
expenditure patterns, 
macroeconomic stability has 
been a fairly wide-spread 
problem plaguing federal 
they need is "the right leadership" to be able to 
divide up the oil resources properly. The.course of 
oil has had a pernicious effect on the economy, on 
politics, and on intellectual life. 
Summing up, the constitution's sections on oil 
appear to satisfy Kurdish and Shiite concerns and 
needs, but not those of the Sunnis. Furthermore, 
the constitution leaves open the possibility of abuse 
of economic poyver by the Kurds and Shiites. The 
constitution's lack of clarity on many oil issues such 
as production and distribution ore also conducive 
to an atmosphere of corruption and the creation of 
a foiled rentier state. 
Clearly, the Iraqi case has a number of unique 
aspects. However, before passing final judgment 
of the constitution's treatment of oil, the experience 
of other oil-producing federal countries may shed 
further insights as to the type of problems Iraq's 
constitution may create. 
Lessons from Other 
Countries 
countries. 
Of the major oil-producing countries, the Nigerian 
experience36 might provide the best insights for 
Iraqi oil policy at this point in time. Nigeria is a 
federal state. As with Iraq, oil is the main source 
of revenue - 82 percent of the total revenue of 
the general government, or 40 percent of GDP in 
2000. 
Revenue Transfer Mechanisms in 
Nigeria 
In theory, the mechanism of revenue transfer is 
straightforward and a formal process set up to 
distribute funds. After so called first charges37 are 
withheld, oil revenue is shared between the federal 
government and the state/local governments 
according to an arrangement whereby the 
remainder (over 75 percent of gross oil revenue) 
is divided between the central government and 
subnational governments. More specifically, 
the 1999 constitution assigns the control and 
collection of oil revenue to the federal government 
but attributes at least 13 percent of the net oil 
revenue to the oil-producing states. In addition, 
about half of the net proceeds (after deduction of 
Oil-producing countries have arrived at a first charges) ore redistributed to state and local 
number of methods for disbursing oil revenues. \ governments according to a formula ,decided by 
Conceptually these foll into two general categories \ parliament ever/ five years. Excess proceeds over 
- the methods adopted by unitary (centralized the budgeted revenue ore also redistributed in 
governments) and those implemented in federal the same way after assigning 13 percent to oil-
settings (Figure 1). As qne might imagine, the producing states. 38 
federal countries have had a more difficult time Nigerian states o~d local governments ore highly 
Guff Yearbook 2oos • ioo6 
dependent on revenue-shoring arrangements with 
the federal government. In 1999, 75 percent of 
state revenue come from redistributed revenue 
from the federal government, including their shore 
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of the VAT (85 percent of total proceeds), and 94 
percent for local government revenue. Most of 
this revenue was oil related. Federation revenue 
released to subnational governments rose from 
7.4 percent of GDP in 1999 to about 15.3 percent 
of GDP in 2001. 
The two key challenges posed by the Nigerian 
model of fiscal federalism are the conflicting 
claims over oil resources and the lac~ of fiscal 
discipline of subnational governments. As sharing 
arrangements for oil revenue 
combine the derivation and 
the distribution principles; they 
remain highly contentious. 
Given large disparities in 
natural resource endowments, 
oil is concentrated in only a 
few of the 36 states, which 
hove onshore or offshore oil 
production. 
Several of the main oil-
producing states have called for total regional 
control over oil revenues. Other oil states have 
claimed that the 13 percent share accruing to 
oil-producing states should also be applied to oil 
revenue from offshore production (which represents 
about 40 percent of oil revenue). Not happy 
with the manner in which their claims have been 
considered, the oil-producing states have in effect 
simply refused to turn over the stipulated share of 
oil revenues to the central government. 39 
Lessons for Iraq . 
Even Nigeria's relatively sophisticated revenue 
sharing agreement hos led to severe political 
problems with the oil-producing states demanding 
and often just taking an increasing share of 
oil revenues. There is no,, reason to believe the 
allocation mechanisms system evolving out of 
the constitution would fair any better.40 In fact, a 
strong case can be made that given the country's 
ethnic make-up and geographic distribution of oil 
reserves, a future Iraqi federation would experience 
many of the problems currently plaguing Nigeria. 
In Nigeria's case, there is a legal mechanism 
to impose fiscal discipline on the lower tiers of 
government. The high oil prices in recent years have 
led to a large increase in the distribution of financial 
resources to subnational governments, particularly 
to oil-producing states, 
without the corresponding 
assignment of new 
expenditure responsibilities. 
The resulting increase in 
aggregate demand has 
led to a rapid increase in 
aggregate demand and 
money supply, leading 
to inflation and a sharp 
depreciation of the currency 
in the parallel market. 
The revenue sharing arrangement leaves virtually 
no room for maneuver on the fiscal side. It places the 
burden of macroeconomic adjustment on the federal 
government with control over less than half of the 
federation revenue. 
Ideally, financial resources to state and local 
governments should be insulated from oil price 
fluctuations, and commensurate with the tasks that 
they ore assigned to perform and their capacity to 
effectively spend such resources. This would imply 
a shift from a transfer system which relies o~ the 
\ shoring of volatile.'notural res.ource rever;iues to one 
\that provides fo/ stable financing of the provision 
of at least o minimum set of essential subnational 
public services. 
Unless these safeguards are somehow 
incorporated into law or through o modification 
of the constitution, one con easily ~isuolize the 
proposed oil shoring arrangements in Iraq leading 
to increased macroeconomic instability, regional 
tensions, and resentment, and overall poor 
economic performance and even a collapse of the 
system. 
Assessment 
A cursory reading of the post e_lection press 
reports suggests more dire predictions than those. 
The common themes stressed by the pessimists 
include the observations to the effect that: 41 
1. The constitutional process is not a sign of Iraqi 
sovereignty and democracy taking hold, but rather 
a consolidation of US influence and control. The 
constitution is likely to make the situation in Iraq 
worse. 
2. The ratification process reflects US, not Iraqi 
urgency. It resulted in a vote in which most Iraqis 
did not even see the draft. Amendments were 
being reopened and negotiated by political parties 
and elites in Baghdad as late as days before the 
referendum. 
3. The constitution will strip Iraqis of future 
control over their notion's oil wealth by opening 
oil new oil exploration and production to foreign 
oil companies. 
4. The imposition of federalism as defined in 
the draft constitution undermines Iraqi notional 
consciousness and sets the state for a potential 
division of Iraq largely along ethnic and religious 
lines, with financial, military, and political power 
devolving from the c_entral government to the 
regional authorities. All groups risk sectoral as vyell 
as notional interests. , 
5. Human rights, including women's rights, 
individual political and civil rights, economi<: and 
social rights, religious rights, minority rights, oil 
remain at risk. 
6. Instead of balancing the interests of Iraq's 
diverse population by referencing its long dominant 
secular approaches, the draft constitution reflects, 
privileges and makes permanent the current 
occupation-fueled turn towards Islamic identity. 
There may be an element of truth to some of 
these points. However, the sections above suggest 
a more fundamental cause of concern - the 
manner in which oil revenues and production will 
be controlled by the regional authorities. 
On a theoretical level, federalism is predicated 
on meeting two, seemingly irreconcilable goals: 
. it seeks to unify diverse, often hostile localities 
under a single national banner, while allowing 
considerable authority to remain at the local level. 
When practiced well, a federal system successfully 
reconciles the two demands, proving citizens with 
the simultaneous benefits of the protection of 
local specific rights, and the wider advantages of 
economies of scale and security allowed for by a 
larger national body. 42 
However, many of the case studies of federalist 
countries, especially in the developing world, 
stress the system's limitations: federalism 
threatens macroeconomic stability, institutionalizes 
discriminatory treatment of citizens, causes 
competition among groups, and encourages the 
lotter to ask for more powers, which often leads to 
separation. In fact, the system has not performed 
well in the developing world. In Asia, Indonesia 
and Pakistan went federal at various times after 
independence, but quickly deserted it, while the 
Malaysian federation led to the exit of Singapore in 
1965. In Africa, Kenya and Ugan_da adopted the 
system after~ndependence but soon abandoned it 
too. In the case of Uganda, it directly resulted in 
the political instability of the late 1960s and the 
civil war that ensued in the next decade. 
The sections above hove identified a similar set 
of potential problems that might arise now that 
the Iraqi constitution hos been approved. One 
thing history tells us is that unless it is structured 
skillfully, any federal system will find it difficult to 
maintain on appropriate balance between local 
and central power. It is safe to conclude that the 
economic sections of the constitution will create 
an environment in which it will be very difficult to 
maintain this balance. 
With oil revenue assignment shifting m~re toward 
the producing regions, the ability and perhaps 
willingness of local governments to pursue 
independent policies will increase with time - the 
likelihood of adverse rentier effects may increase 
with oil revenues concentrated in the hands of the 
regional governments. In this environment it is 
easy to visualize a vicious circle setting in (Figure 
longer term focus with stabilization funds providing 
a supporting macroeconomic environment. 
As noted above, before the referendum 
the constitution drafters added o lost minute 
mechanism to review and amend the constitution 
in the first half of 2006. Because of their boycott of 
the elections in early 2005 and subsequent under-
representation in drafting of the constitution, 
the Sunnis should have considerably more input 
in the amendment process. Hopefully, the next 
government with larger Sunni participation will see 
a more evenly balanced debate concerning the 
economic challenges facing the country. 
There are some encouraging signs. For the 
southern provinces, interviews of voters suggest 
that the critical issue is to ensure that the proceeds 
of Iraq's oil exports are distributed more fairly than 
in the past - something 2) whereby the distributive 
formulas embedded in 
the constitution skew 
policy making decisions 
towards an over-reliance 
on oil revenues, leading to 
poor economic outcomes 
which in turn skew policy 
preferences more toward 
short run distributive rather 
One ·option thot has received that is explicitly catered 
surprisingly little . attention is for in the constitution. The 
the· simple ·one of distributing impulse towards creating 
a relatively large share of o virtual separate state is 
oil revenues directly to the · not as strong in the south 
population, A c:leor advantage as it is in the Kurdish north. 
qfthis approacn is that if would Southern voters, for the most 
give .the Sunnis a dear stoke in part, seemed to view the 
' fhtfsvccess of the economy. constitution as a vital step 
than efficiency outcomes. towards peace and stability, 
If rentier state effects subsequently strengthen, rather than as a divisive, provocative formula for 
corruption and a more active insurgency are likely Shio-Kurdish collaboration to suppress the once 
to reinforce the process of economic decline. dominant Sunni Arab minority. 43 Although the 
On the other hand, if rentier state effects can be Sunnis opposed the decentralization structure of 
controlled or weakened th~m economic outcomes the new constitution, their opposition centers more 
improve and with it the possibility of establishing a, on the potential ,loss of oil revenues t_o the Kurds 
virtuous circle strengthening the federation and with , and Shi' a and 11ess on regaining co~trol of the 
increased political stability, thus leading to further entire country. 44 
gains in economic activity. This longer term virtuous What might the new government with increased 
circle con be further strengthened if stability results Sunni participation want to consider in the way of 
in a reorientation of economic policies from short to modifying the economic sections of the existing 
I( n 11 w ! e d i e .f o t . A I I 
constitution? One option that has rece'lv.ed 
surprisingly little attention is the simple one 'of 
distributing a relatively large share of oil revenues 
directly to the population. A clear advantage of 
this approach is that it would give the Sunnis a 
clear stake .. in the success of th~ economy. Acts 
of insurgency that would jeopardize oil revenues 
would directly hurt large segments of the Sunni 
community. Formalization of this type of distributive 
system would allay Sunni fears that sometime in 
nowLei.i11e 
I 
the future they would be completely cut off from 
the country's oil revenues. 
A number of other benefits ·would also flow 
from the direct disbursement policy. With direct 
payments, massive subsidies and price controls 
would no longer be needed and could be quickly 
phased out, leaving prices to be determined by 
market forces. The broad-based demand that 
would be created from increased purchasing power 
no doubt would provide the opportunity for more 
profitable small-scale private sector businesses. 
Many studies of small- and medium-sized (SMEs) 
businesses in developing countries have concluded 
that businesses of this type ore the chief engines of 
job creation and innovative activity. 
As the experience of the transition countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe has shown, in addition 
to job creation and innovation, growing business 
sectors often find it in their best interest to press 
governments for additional market reforms. 
Governments, in turn, find it is in their interest to 
nurture this new base of prosperity and respond 
accordingly. In this way, it is conceivable that a 
virtuous circle of growth, reform, and further growth 
could be put in place over time in Iraq. The country 
hos the broad-based talent, skills, and ingenuity 
to prosper if it con only break the link between 
state and oil, with its corrupting and debilitating 
influence. 
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